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cationrules whenacentral authorityprovides inputsfor theprovisionof socialservices
by local governments, as well as when local governments differ in their needs. Under a
quantity-based mechanism, the input choices of high-need localities will tend to be dis-
torteddownward.Toconvincethecenteroftheirhigherneeds,thesecommunitiessignal
theirstatusbyspendingtoolittle.However,underanexpenditure-basedmechanism,the
direction of distortion of the input choices of high-need localities depends on the price
elasticityofdemandforthelocalinput.Whendemandisinelastic(elastic),tosignaltheir
highneeds,high-needlocalitiesspendtoomuch(little)onlocalinputs.Ifsocialservices
have positive interjurisdictional externalities, expenditure-based mechanisms are
preferred, at least in the case of inelastic demand.
Keywords: intergovernmental transfers; matching grants
1. INTRODUCTION
Responsibility for the provision of public goods and publicly pro-
videdprivategoodsisoftensharedbetweendifferentlevelsofgovern-
ment. For example, in the health sector, lower levels of government
might cover primary health care expenditures, while higher levels
contribute to the provision of hospital care. Similarly, local govern-
ments in the United States often have responsibility for primary and
secondary schooling, while state governments contribute more to
tertiary education spending.
AUTHOR’SNOTE:ThankstoMattHaag,RogerLagunoff,andArikLevinson,aswellastothe
editor and two referees, for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors are mine.
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thedesiretocapturescaleeconomies,whichcallforcentralprovision,
against the allocative efficiency gains that may derive from better lo-
cal information (Oates 1972). More recently, researchers have exam-
ined the internal organization of government as an exercise in ensur-
ing accountability (e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999; Seabright
1996),constrainingcollusion(e.g.,LaffontandMartimort1998),and
providing implicit incentives through ownership (e.g., Besley and
Ghatak 2001; Jack 2004).
This article takes the organization of government—that is, the de-
greeofdecentralization—asgivenandstartsfromthesimpleobserva-
tion that the optimal level of central government financing of local
public goods is likely to depend on local information. Intergovern-
mental transfer mechanisms will then need to be designed so as to
elicit this information and to respond to it. I examine this mechanism
design problem facing the higher level of government when local
needs differ.
Modeling intergovernmental transfers as incentive schemes is not
new (see, e.g., Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini 2001). What this
article does is to examine the properties of two natural means by
which a central government might provide incentives. Under the first
scheme, local governments are held accountable for their actions, in
thesensethattheyarerewardedaccordingtotheattainmentofcertain
performance measures, such as primary health care coverage rates or
pupil-teacher ratios. The second incentive scheme bases intergovern-
mentaltransfersinsteadonlocalgovernmentexpendituresandcanbe
thought of as a reward for revenue mobilization effort. Both of these
ways of generating incentives are used in practice. Examples in the
United States include the accountability provisions of the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 and the federal funding contributions based
onstateMedicaidexpenditures.Althoughbothschemesconsideredin
this article make transfers conditional on costly local government
choices, I find that the nature of the distortionary effects of the two
mechanisms, when optimally designed, differ qualitatively. While
there is a growing literature on the analysis of intergovernmental
transfers as a mechanism design problem (see, e.g., Bordignon,
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Marchand,andPestieau1996;HuberandRunkel2003),noneofthese
studies has compared the design of transfers based on alternative
signals.
A very simple environment is assumed, in which two inputs are
usedbylocalgovernmentstodeliveranoutput.Theseinputscouldbe






health status or productivity.
1
The task of the central government is to allocate a fixed supply of
(funding for) the second input across localities.
2 The efficient alloca-
tionofthecentrallyprovidedinputcouldbeensuredbysellingittolo-
calities at a market-clearing price. But if the input is to be distributed
freeofchargetolocalitiesintheformofacategoricalgrant,thecenter
must design a revelation mechanism that induces localities to truth-
fully reveal their needs. Clearly, if the center simply offers a menu of
levels of the centrally provided input, all localities will choose the
highestleveloffinancingoffered,anddifferentialallocationswillnot
be incentive compatible.
Local needs are modeled by assuming that the productivity of the
locallyprovidedinputvariesacrossjurisdictions,takingononeoftwo
possiblevalues.Thus,foragivenlevelof(centrallyfinanced)hospital
care, the impact of an increase in primary health care on health status
is assumed to be smaller in localities with greater health needs. One
waytointerpretthisisthatlocalitieswithgreaterneedsfacehigherlo-
cal input costs measured in productivity-adjusted units. A natural
sourceofthesedifferentialcostsisthelabormarket,assomelocalities
arelikelytohavetopayhigherwagesforprimaryschoolteachersand
general practitioners than others.
Ourfocusoncategoricalgrantsorin-kindtransfersissupportedby
Huber and Runkel (2003), who show in a similar model that neither
unconditional block grants nor open-ended matching grants can im-
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categorical grants (or, equivalently, closed-end matching grants) are
required. Like this article, both Cornes and Silva (2003) and Huber
and Runkel (2003) consider environments with two public goods.
However, in the former, transfers are based on aggregate local spend-
ing,andinthelatter,theyarebasedonlocalexpendituresononeofthe
goods.
Despite the existence of self-selection constraints, in this binary
model,theefficientallocationofagivenaggregatelevelofthecentral
input is sometimes possible. In other cases, incentive constraints
preclude the attainment of an efficient allocation, but in general, it
remains possible to implement a differential allocation across juris-




from their efficient levels.
However, I find that the direction of distortion depends on the sig-
nalusedbythecentralgovernment.Whenthecentrallyprovidedinput
is allocated on the basis of observed local-level inputs, high-cost lo-
calitiessignaltheirtypesbyperforming toolittleprimaryhealthcare/
education,giventhelevelofthecentrallyprovidedinput.Correspond-
ingly, health status or educational attainments are inefficiently low.
On the other hand, when the centrally provided input is made contin-
gent on local expenditures on primary health care/education, high-
costlocalitiessignaltheirtypesbyspendingeithertoomuchortoolit-
tle on the local input. They spend too much if unconstrained demand
for the local input is inelastic (so that localities with higher costs, cet-
erisparibus,spendmore),andtheyspendtoolittleifdemandiselastic
(so higher cost localities spend less).
These comparative results show that while incentive con-
straints lead to local production inefficiency in general, the nature of
that inefficiency—that is, the direction of the distortion to local input
choices—depends on the mechanism for implementing the intergov-
ernmental transfer. The simpleintuition for the result isthat localities
with high costs, which are allocated higher centrally provided inputs,
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quantity oflocallyprovidedinputsisusedtocondition centralalloca-
tions, they can do this by using few of them, thus lowering program
outcomes. On the other hand, when expenditures on local primary-
level inputs are observable, high-cost localities can convince the cen-
ter of their types by incurring either relatively high or low expenses,
dependingontheelasticity,therebyeither“overachieving”or“under-
achieving” in terms of program outcomes.
Therearebothnormativeandpositiveimplicationsofthisanalysis.
First, a central government choosing between a quantity and an ex-




then inducing high-cost localities to overspend on local inputs would
likely be preferable. An expenditure-based intergovernmental grant
system would then be preferred, as long as local demand is inelastic.
Second, as an empirical matter, the model predicts that in a federal
systeminwhichstatesmaketransferstolocalauthorities, theaverage
stringency of requirements placed on local governments should vary
across states according to what kind of mechanism (quantity or
expenditure based) each state adopts.
The next section describes the economic environment and objec-
tives of central and local governments. Section 3 analyzes the design
of intergovernmental grants based on quantity choices at the local
level,andexpenditure-basedtransfersareexaminedinsection4.Sec-
tion 5 discusses the policy and empirical implications of the model in
more detail, and section 6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
A local government combines a locally provided input, x, and a
centrallyprovidedinput,y,toproduceanoutcomez=ζ(x,y).Thepro-
duction function, ζ, is increasing and quasi-concave, with ζ(x,0 )>0
andζ(0,y)>0forx,y>0.Thisoutcomeisnoncontractible, socentral
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tionwhenzisasocialsectoroutcome,likehealthstatusoreducational
attainment. Localitieshavethe sameproduction function but facepo-
tentiallydifferentunitcosts,θ,ofprovidingthelocalinputx.Forsim-
plicity, Iassumethat therearejust two types of locality. High-cost lo-
calities have higher costs than low-cost localities, that is, θH > θL.A
proportion λ of the localities have low costs.
The social value of the outcome z is v(z), where v(.) is increasing
and concave. Denote the net social value of an arbitrary input vector
(x,y)toalocalitywithcostsθbyw(x,y,θ)=φ(x,y)–θx,whereφ(x,y)
≡ v(ζ(x, y)). Given a centrally provided input level y, the maximal net
value to the locality is




higher costs choose lower local inputs, ∂x*/∂θ = 1/φxx < 0.
The central government has a budget Y to distribute in-kind to lo-
calities. It seeks to maximize the unweighted social value of the ser-
vices that this resource produces. Thus, the center’s problem is to
max
, yy LH
λω θ λ ω θ (, )( ) (, ) yy LL HH +− 1
s.t. λλ yy Y LH +− = () 1 . (1)
When local input costs are observable by the center (and contract-
ible), the first best allocation is attainable using an intergovernmental
transfer yy ss
* *( ) ≡θ satisfying the budget constraint and the first-
order condition
ωθ ωθ 11 (, ) (, )
** yy LL HH = .
If the central government announces these allocations and solicits re-
ports of θ, all localities will claim to have high costs, and the center’s
budget constraint will be violated. In the following two sections, I
characterizethesecond-best(i.e.,incentivecompatible)efficientallo-
cations under the quantity- and expenditure-based mechanisms.
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In this section, it is supposed that the central government can ob-
serveanindicatorofthequantityoflocalinputschosenandcondition
its allocation on these. The central government thus chooses a pair of
input vectors, (xL, yL), (xH, yH), so that if a locality chooses local input
xs, it is allocated centrally provided inputs ys. The center’s problem is
then to
max
(, ) , ( ) , xy xy LL HH
λθ λ θ wx y wx y LLL HHH (,, )( ) (, , ) +− 1
s.t. λλ yy Y LH +− = () 1 (2)
and wx y wx y sss sss (,, ) (,, ) , θθ ≥ ′ for sL H s = ,,≠ ′ s .
Toemploygraphicalarguments,itturnsouttobesimplertowritea
locality’s value function in terms of the outcome z, the local input x,
and the cost parameter θ. Let
Bzx vz x ( ,,) ( ) θθ =−
be this function. It is easy to confirm that iso-value curves in (x, z)–
space are increasing and convex and satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees sin-
gle crossing property, ∂∂ ∂ <
2 0 zx / θ (see Figure 1). For an arbitrary
centrally provided input level ys, the feasible (x, z) pairs available to
the locality satisfy zs = ζ(x, ys).
3.1. IMPLEMENTABLE ALLOCATIONS
Ifalocalityoftypeθstreatsthelevelofthecentrallyprovidedinput
ys as exogenous, then its best choice of local inputs is xy ss
*() , which
solvesmaxxB(z,x,θs)s.t.z=ζ(x,ys).Ontheotherhand,apairofinput
vectors (xL, yL), (xH, yH) satisfies the incentive constraints in (2) if and
only if
Bz x x Bz x x ss ss ss ss ( ( ), , ) ( ( ), , ) θθ ≥ ′
fors=L,H,ands′≠s.Thus, wesayacentralallocation (yL,yH)iseffi-
cientlyimplementable ifandonly if(xy y LL L
* () ,),(xy y HH H
* () ,)isin-
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ciently implementable central allocation. Note that the uniform
allocation yL = yH = Y is trivially efficiently implementable and, by
continuity,soisanyfeasibleallocationwithyL<Y<yHandwithyLand
yH close enough to Y.
However,ifthecentralgovernmentwishestoallocatewidelydiffer-






* xyy x HLH H < ,atwhich
the low-cost localities’ iso-value curve passes through the curve z =
ζ(x, yH). Note that any value of xH less than ~ x H is also part of an
implementable allocation but is constrained inefficient. In addition,
there is a value 
* xx HH > such that for xx HH >  , the pair (xy LL
* , ),
(, ) xy HH is incentive compatible for the low-cost localities. However,
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Figure 1: The Centrally Provided Inputs, yL and yH, Are Efficiently
Implementable under the Quantity-Based Mechanism
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localities,whichpreferpointCbythesinglecrossingproperty,soitis
notimplementable.Finally,thereisnoneedtodistorttheallocationto
thelow-costlocalitiesawayfrom(xy y LL L
* () ,)sincethisonlyreduces
theirwelfarelevelwhilerequiringafurtherdistortionintheallocation





of high-cost localities will be distorted below their efficient levels,
yieldinglowerhealth/educationoutcomesthanwouldobtainintheab-
sence of the incentive constraints. The local input choices of low-cost
localities are not distorted.
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Figure 2: The Centrally Provided Inputs, yL and yH, Are Not Efficiently
Implementable. TheLocalInputChoiceofHigh-NeedLocalitiesIsDis-
torted Downward, to ~ * xx HH < .
  © 2005 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at GEORGETOWN UNIV LIBRARY on January 14, 2008  http://pfr.sagepub.com Downloaded from 3.2. OPTIMAL CENTRAL ALLOCATIONS
Thecenter’smaximizationproblem(1)mustbereformulatedtoac-
countfortheincentivecompatibilityconstraint.Thus,letyL=(Y–(1–
λ)yH)/λ (so that (yL, yH) is feasible), and define
~(,)
(,)


















as the implementable welfare of a high-cost locality when centrally
provided inputs are (yL, yH). This value function exhibits a kink—and
the marginal value function a jump down—at the point at which the




λω θ λ ω θ (, )( ) ~(, ) yy LL HH +− 1
s.t. λλ yy Y LH +− = () 1 .
This problem is illustrated graphically in Figure 3. Three regimes are
apparent. In panel (a) of the figure, the optimal division of the central
input is fully efficient, and localities’ own input choices are undis-
torted. In panel (b), the incentive constraint binds, and the allocation
of central inputs is distorted toward low-cost localities, compared
with the fully efficient allocation. However, this allocative ineffi-
ciency is not matched by a production inefficiency: both high- and
low-cost localities continue to choose their own inputs efficiently,
conditional on the central allocations. Finally, in panel (c), both cen-
tralallocationsandlocaldecisionsaredistorted,andthemechanismis
both allocatively and productively inefficient, compared with the
unconstrained allocation.
4. EXPENDITURE-BASED MECHANISMS
In this section, I perform a similarexerciseto section 3.1 and char-
acterize the implementable allocations under an expenditure-based
mechanism. Because the results on optimal division of the central in-
put are qualitatively similar to those under a quantity-based mecha-
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issue.
Define expenditures on the local input by e = θx, and let
β(, ) () ze vz e =−
be a locality’s value of reaching an outcome z while spending e. Note
thatin(e,z)–space,alllocalitieshavethesameincreasing and convex
















yL),(eH,yH)thatspecifiesthelevelofcentrally provided input, ys,con-
ditional on an incurred expenditure on local inputs es. This pair is in-








































efficiently implementable if and only if (ey y LL L
* () ,), (ey y HH H
* () ,)i s
incentive compatible, and λyL +( 1–λ)yH = Y. Figure 4 shows an effi-
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Figure 3: Optimal Centrally Provided Inputs: (a) Allocative and Production Effi-
ciency, (b) Allocative Inefficiency but Production Inefficiency, and (c)
Allocative and Production Inefficiency
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uniform allocation yL = yH = Y is trivially efficiently implementable
and, by continuity, so is any feasible allocation with yL < Y < yH and
with yL and yH close enough to Y.
3
Asinthecaseofthequantity-based instrument, whenthecentrally
provided input levels differ enough, efficient implementation is pre-
cluded.However,thedirectionoftheinduceddistortion nowdepends
on the elasticity of demand for the locally provided input. To seethis,
supposedemandforthelocallyprovidedinputisinelastic,andexpen-
ditures increase with θ. Figure 5 shows an example of a pair of cen-
trally provided inputs, yL < yH, that is not efficiently implementable.
First,notethatifbothhigh-andlow-costlocalitiesreceiveyHfromthe
center, then their expenditures on the local input satisfy e*(yH, θH)>
e*(yH, θL). Efficient implementation of the pair of central inputs (yL,
yH) would require low-cost localities to produce at point C and high-
costlocalitiestolocateatpointA.However,giventhischoice,thelow-
costlocalitycanmisrepresentitstypeandlocateatpointD.Toensure
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Figure 4: The Pair of Centrally Provided Inputs, yL and yH, Is Efficiently
Implementable under the Expenditure-Based Mechanism
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at C, it is necessary to distort the production of high-cost localities to
point E, where expenditures on the local input are ~ * ee HH > .
Alternatively, distorting the production of high-cost localities to
point F, where expenditures on the local input are 
* ee HH < , also en-
sures incentive compatibility. However, it is straightforward to check
that, under the elasticity condition, high-cost localities strictly prefer









φθ (/,) , (4)
thenaslocalexpendituresareincreasedfrom  eH to~ eH,holdingcentral
inputsatyH,thedifferencebetweenthevalueofservicesproducedbya
low-cost locality, φ(e/θL, yH), and the value of those produced by a
high-cost locality, φ(e/θH, yH), falls. Since, by definition, the net value
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Figure 5: The Pair of Centrally Provided Inputs, yL and yH, Is Not Efficiently
Implementable.Demand for the Local Input Is Inelastic,and the Pair Is
Implemented Optimally by Distorting the Local Expenditure Choice of
High-Need Localities to ~ * ee HH > .
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to a low-cost locality is the sameat  eH and~ eH, it must therefore be the
casethatthehigherexpenditurelevel(~ eH)ispreferredbythehigh-cost











Conversely, if local expenditures fall as input costs increase, hold-
ing central inputs fixed, the input choices of high-cost localities are
distorted downwards when central input pairs are not efficiently
implementable. Figure 6 illustrates this case. Now, efficient imple-
mentation of the pair of centrally provided inputs yL < yH requires the
high- and low-cost localities producing at points A and C, respec-
tively. With this choice, the low-cost localities can imitate those with
high input costs and produce at D, which they prefer to C. To reattain
incentive compatibility, the high-cost localities’ production must be
distortedtoeitherpointEorpointF,andbyasimilarreasoningtothat
above, E is preferred, as long as ε > 1.
This discussion is summarized in the following result:
Proposition2:Underanexpenditure-basedallocationmechanism,ifcen-
trally provided inputs are close enough to uniform, they can be imple-
mentedefficiently.However, iftheydiffer sufficiently, thelocalinput
choicesof high-cost localitieswillbedistorted above (below) theiref-
ficientlevelsasε<(>)1,yieldinghigher(lower)health/educationout-
comes than would obtain in the absence of the incentive constraints.
The local input choices of low-cost localities are not distorted.
Finally, consider the knife-edge case of unit elastic demand, ε =1 .
In this case, given a value of y, the optimal expenditure on the local
public good is independent of a locality’s input cost. However, this
doesnotmeanthatthecentralgovernmentisunabletodeviseamech-
anismthatinducesseparationofhigh-andlow-costtypeswithyL<yH.
As in the two examples above, the expenditure of the high-cost local-
ity must be distorted in one direction or the other. In the case of ε >1 ,
shown in Figure 6, the downward distortion (to~ eH) is less costly than
theupwarddistortion(to  eH).Whenε<1,theupwarddistortionisless
costly than the downward distortion. However, when ε = 1, both dis-
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tortionsareequallycostly,andthecenterisindifferentbetweeninduc-
ing the high-cost locality to overspend or underspend.
5. SOME IMPLICATIONS
The normative policy implications of this exercise depend on the
costs of gathering information about local government choices. In-
deed, if both local quantity and expenditure decisions could be
costlesslyobserved,thenunderlyinglocalcostscouldbeinferred,and
therewouldbenoincentiveproblem.Ontheotherhand,ifonekindof
signal is administratively much cheaper to collect than the other, the
mechanism that conditions on the cheaper signal should likely be
used. However, the costs of information collection may well be
nonnegligible and similar for each kind of signal. For example, com-
pleteandwell-enforcedaccountingstandardsarecostlytoimplement,
and recent corporate history in the United States confirms that the
scopeforfinancialslightofhandshouldnotbeunderestimated.Simi-
Figure 6: The Pair of Centrally Provided Inputs, yL and yH, Is Not Efficiently
Implementable. In This Case, Demand for the Local Input Is Elastic,
and the Pair Is Implemented Optimally by Distorting the Local Expen-
diture Choice of High-Need Localities to ~ * ee HH < .
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straightforward in principle, adjusting these measures for quality (in-
cluding attendance and on-the-job performance) is likely to be diffi-
cult and costly.
If collecting information on both quantities and expenditures is
prohibitively costly, then the choice of which mechanism to use will
come down to which distortion is less costly. A priori, it is difficult to
tell whether over- or underprovision of health or education services
would be more costly. However, if, as is widely believed, these ser-
vices have positive externalities associated with them, then inducing
high-cost localities to overspend on local inputs would likely be pref-
erable. An expenditure-based intergovernmental grant system would
then be preferred, as long as local demand is inelastic.
The positive implication of the comparative analysis of this article
is that the precise method by which intergovernmental transfers are
used to provide incentives under asymmetric information can affect
the observed distribution of spending on public (or publicly provided
private) goods. For example, the model predicts that, in a federal sys-
tem, “holding states accountable for their actions” by mandating cer-
tain such actions (i.e., a quantity-based system) would require that
high-cost states be induced to clear relatively low hurdles (compared
to the first best). On the other hand, “rewarding states for mobilizing
resources”(i.e.,usinganexpenditure-basedmechanism)wouldmean
thatthesamestatesshouldbeinducedtochooserelativelydemanding
options (assuming inelastic demand). A useful empirical test of the
analysis of the model presented here could be carried out in acountry
with (at least) three tiers of government, such as the United States.
One could focus on the incentive mechanisms that states use to allo-
cate financing across heterogeneous counties and examine how the
performance standards placed on local governments vary across
states.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This article has compared the distortions associated with alterna-
tive intergovernmental allocation rules when a central authority fi-
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have concentrated on the social sectors—health and education—for
tworeasons.First,thesesectorsreceivealargeamountofpublicfund-
ing in many countries, much of which isprovided by both centraland
local governments. And second, the outputs in the health and educa-
tion sectors are notoriously difficult to monitor, so it is highly likely
thatanyincentivemechanismwilluseinformationoninputuserather
than observed outcomes.
I have examined the implications of alternative measures of local
input usefor thedesign and efficiencyproperties of centralallocation
mechanisms when localities differ in their costs, represented here as
theunitcostofproductivity-adjustedlocalinputs.Underthequantity-
based mechanism studied, a central government can gather informa-
tion on the reallevelof inputs employed atthe local levelbut maynot
be able to accurately measurethe associated expenditures, say, due to
difficulties in attributing various budgetary costs. In this case, to im-
plementdifferentialallocations ofthecentralinput according tolocal
costs,theinputchoicesofhigh-costlocalitieswilltendtobedistorted
downwards. To convince the center of their higher costs, these com-
munitieswillsignaltheirstatusby spending too little(comparedwith
the efficient outcome).
Alternatively, under an expenditure-based mechanism, the central
government gathers information on local expenditures but cannot
measure the real level of resources employed. In this case, the direc-
tion of distortion of the input choices of high-cost localities depends
on the price elasticity of demand for the local input. When demand is
inelastic(elastic),tosignaltheirhigh costs,high-cost localitiesspend
too much (little) on local inputs (again, relative to the efficient
outcome).
A central government choosing between the two intergovernmen-
taltransfermechanismsmustweighthedistortionarycostsassociated
with each, although it is difficult to predict which mechanism will be
less distortionary without putting much more structure on the model.
However,ifsocialsectorexpendituresareexpectedtohavelargeposi-
tive externalities, then inducing overprovision at the local level is the
preferred option, and an expenditure-based mechanism should be
adopted (assuming inelastic demand).
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1. Ofcourse,inpractice,thecentralgovernmentwouldimplementsuchgrantsbymakingfi-
nancialtransferstolocalitiesandrestrictingtheuseofthefundstopurchasesofthesecondinput.




mand for the local public good is inelastitc. Similarly efficient and incentive-compatible trans-
fersarealsopossiblewhendemandiselastic.Toeconomizeonspace,Idonotincludeaseparate
figure to illustrate this possibility.
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